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Multinational Efforts to Limit Intellectual
Property Income Shifting: The OECD’s Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project
Jeffrey A. Maine*
Before 2017, there were two major international movements going on at
the same time: (1) the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement1; and (2)
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD’s)
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project. The movements presented a
unique opportunity to consider the intersection of a behemoth multinational
trade agreement and ambitious multinational efforts to close international tax
loopholes. The opportunity, however, was short lived. In January 2017,
newly elected U.S. President Donald Trump unsigned the TPP as a matter of
unilateral Executive power, sounding the death knell for the regional trade
pact for all countries involved.2
* Maine Law Foundation Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law.
1. Trans-Pacific Partnership, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., Feb. 4, 2016. The TPP
was a trade agreement among a dozen countries (the United States and eleven
Pacific Rim countries) to develop a closer relationship on economic policies
and regulation. The TPP would have promoted strong and balanced intellectual
property standards to promote innovation and creativity. The TPP would also
have removed many tariffs (i.e., taxes on imports) and other barriers to trade.
U.S. President Obama, who was given “fast track” authority for the agree-
ment, highlighted the importance of the trade agreement and the importance of
exports for the U.S economy (e.g., the more U.S. companies export Made-in-
America products abroad, the more high-paying jobs can be supported in the
United States). The Trans-Pacific Partnership: What You Need to Know about
President Obama’s Trade Agreement, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse
.gov/issues/economy/trade (noting U.S. companies that export pay up to eigh-
teen percent more than companies that do not). It was estimated that the “TPP
ha[d] the potential to unleash $20 billion in new global investment and create
233,000 FDI-related U.S. jobs.” October News Update, ORG. FOR INT’L INV.
(Oct. 23, 2015), http://www.ofii.org/news/october-news-update.
The TPP was not without its critics. Some argued that the TPP would inten-
sify competition between countries’ labor forces—i.e., American companies
would offshore a massive amount of manufacturing jobs to countries offering
lower wages to boost company profits. “According to the Economic Policy
Institute, the United States [would] lose more than 130,000 jobs to Vietnam
and Japan alone. . . .” The Trans-Pacific Trade (TPP) Agreement Must Be
Defeated, SENATOR BERNIE SANDERS, https://www.sanders.senate.gov/down
load/the-trans-pacific-trade-tpp-agreement-must-be-defeated?inline=file. Crit-
ics pointed to jobs lost under previous trade agreements: The United States lost
700,000 as a result of NAFTA, 2.7 million as a result of Permanent Normal
Trade Relations with China, and 70,000 as a result of the Korea Free Trade
Agreement. Id.
2. See Memorandum from the White House, Withdrawal of the United States
from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement, 82 Fed. Reg.
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Although the TPP is essentially dead, the OECD’s BEPS Project is not.
Indeed, many nations have been adopting BEPS Project proposals to prevent
international tax avoidance by multinational companies. With that said, how-
ever, the United States’ commitment to adopting BEPS Project proposals is
far from certain. For the United States, at least, the end of the era of multina-
tional trade agreements could signal the end of the era of multilateral efforts
to close international tax loopholes. This article looks at the OECD’s BEPS
Project, and its implications for multinational companies and many
countries.3
I. THE OECD BEPS PROJECT
At nearly the same time that the TPP was introduced as the first trade
deal of the 21st century, the OECD, at the request of the G-20, delivered
several recommendations on how to close international tax loopholes used by
many multinational companies worldwide. It has become widely known now
that many multinational companies with foreign operations have reduced
their domestic and foreign tax burdens by transferring their intellectual prop-
erty assets and operations to controlled foreign subsidiaries in low-tax coun-
tries. And there is now evidence that the practice has resulted in significant
erosion of domestic tax bases. The United States estimates its loss of corpo-
rate revenue to be over $100 billion every year to low (or zero) tax countries,
such as Ireland, Switzerland, and the Netherlands, as well as sandy tax
havens like Bermuda and the Cayman Islands.4 Economic studies estimate
that for the global market, including the United States, revenue losses may
exceed $280 billion per year.5 The OECD recently found the annual net tax
8,497 (Jan. 23, 2017) (failure of the United States to ratify the agreement killed
the TPP for all other signatories).
3. See JEFFREY A. MAINE & XUAN-THAO NGUYEN, THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
HOLDING COMPANY: TAX USE AND ABUSE FROM VICTORIA’S SECRET TO APPLE
(2017) (detailed treatment of the subject).
4. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 121ST CONG., JCX-141R-15, ESTI-
MATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2015–2019 (2015),
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4857; Kimberly A.
Clausing, The Effect of Profit Shifting on the Corporate Tax Base in the United
States and Beyond 2, 7 (June 17, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2685442.
5. Kimberly A. Clausing, The Effect of Profit Shifting on the Corporate Tax Base
in the United States and Beyond 2 (June 17, 2016) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2685442.
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revenue loss to be up to $240 billion.6 And developed countries are not alone;
base erosion is a large problem in developing countries as well.7
Base erosion due to profit shifting by multinationals is viewed as eco-
nomically unjustified. Less tax revenues means cuts in vital government ser-
vices, increased budget deficits, and higher tax burdens on other taxpayers
including individuals and smaller businesses. Beyond their negative revenue
effects, tax laws that permit intellectual property income shifting provide
multinational companies significant and unfair competitive advantages over
smaller domestic companies that cannot use overseas operations and offshore
tax gimmicks to lower their effective corporate tax rate.8 Such laws also cre-
ate harmful economic distortions. For example, domestic firms are incen-
tivized to invest and grow business activities abroad rather than in their home
country, thus devoting substantial resources to tax planning instead of pro-
ductive investment.9 In addition to being economically unjustified, base ero-
sion due to income shifting has become socially unacceptable. In recent
years, public outrage at the tax avoidance techniques used by large multina-
tional companies has increased and is particularly pronounced in Europe.10
The OECD’s BEPS Project, which involves a coordinated effort among
many countries to reduce corporate tax avoidance, is the most important de-
velopment in cross border taxation in decades. The final OECD BEPS Pro-
ject Reports, issued in October 2015, make concrete recommendations to
help nations address income shifting problems.11 Many of these recom-
6. OECD, MEASURING AND MONITORING BEPS: ACTION 11 FINAL REPORT 79
(2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264241343-en [hereinafter OECD, MEA-
SURING AND MONITORING BEPS].
7. See id. at 29; MARK P. KEIGHTLEY & JEFFREY M. STUPAK, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R44013, CORPORATE TAX BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING
(BEPS): AN EXAMINATION OF THE DATA 21 (2015).
8. These concerns have been raised by many, including members of Congress.
Hearing Before S. Permanent Subcomm. on Offshore Profit Shifting and the
U.S. Tax Code, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin); Hearing
Before S. Permanent Subcomm. on Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax
Code, 113th Cong. (2013) (opening statement of Sen. John McCain).
9. These concerns have been raised by many, including the former U.S. Adminis-
tration. See WHITE HOUSE & U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT’S
FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS TAX REFORM: AN UPDATE 11 (2016), https://www
.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/The-Presidents-Frame
work-for-Business-Tax-Reform-An-Update-04-04-2016.pdf.
10. In 2012, for instance, protests in Britain led Starbucks to agree voluntarily to
pay an extra sixteen million pounds in British taxes above what it would nor-
mally have had to pay. See Allison Christians, How Starbuck Lost Its Social
License—and Paid 20 Million to Get it Back, 71 TAX NOTES INT’L 637,
637–38 (2013).
11. See OECED, BEPS 2015 FINAL REPORTS (2015), http://www.oecd.org/tax/
beps-2015-final-reports.htm.
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mended action plans, which provide principles (minimum standards) for ap-
propriate taxation of multinational companies, attempt to tax profits where
value is added and to promote greater tax transparency with increased infor-
mation exchange between tax authorities.12
Although the OECD Model Treaty is a residence-based model, many of
the BEPS Project actions attempt to increase taxation in the source country
(as opposed to the residence country) and tax profits where value is added.13
For example, current transfer pricing rules rely on the arm’s-length princi-
ple.14 The principle looks at which related companies are performing impor-
tant functions, contributing assets, and controlling risks.15 But, with its
emphasis on contractual allocations of functions, assets, and risks, the arm’s
length principle can easily be manipulated by multinational companies and
result in intellectual property income that does not align with the economic
activity that produced it.16 Actions Eight, Nine, and Ten of the BEPS Project
target this issue to ensure that income is allocated to the country where value
is created.17 Specifically, in revised guidelines (in the form of amendments to
the OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines), BEPS attempts to replace or sup-
plement the contractual arrangements between the related parties with the
conduct of the parties if the contracts are incomplete or are not supported by
the conduct.18 This will lead to the allocation of intellectual property income
to locations where contributions are made and to where business activities
are conducted.19 In short, Actions Eight through Ten maintain the arm’s
length principle, but also ensure that transfer-pricing outcomes are more in
sync with value creation.20 The actions will not eliminate the use of cash-
12. Treasury’s International Tax Initiatives, Before S. Finance Comm., 114th
Cong. (2014) (Deputy Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Treasury Department,
Robert B. Stack, noting that the “principal target of the BEPS project is so-
called ‘stateless income,’ basically very low or non-taxed income within a mul-
tinational group”).
13. See H. David Rosenbloom & Joseph P. Brother, Reflections on the Intersection
of U.S. Tax Treaty Policy, U.S. Tax Reform, and BEPS, 78 TAX NOTES INT’L
759, 764 (May 25, 2015) (noting many of the BEPS actions “point clearly in
the direction of greater source-basis taxation”).
14. See OECD, BEPS 2015 FINAL REPORTS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES 27 (2015),
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-reports-2015-executive-summaries.pdf [hereinaf-
ter OECD, BEPS 2015 EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES].
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 27–28.
18. Id. at 28.
19. Id.
20. See OECD, BEPS 2015 EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES, supra note 14, at 27–28, 30.
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rich, low-functioning foreign subsidiaries, but they are designed to make
their role less relevant in income-shifting tax planning.21
Many countries have enacted so-called “patent box” or “innovation
box” regimes, which basically provide a reduced effective tax rate on income
associated with eligible intellectual property.22 Patent boxes can “unfairly
erode the tax bases of other countries, potentially distorting the location of
capital and services,” especially when they are offered to entities that engage
in no substantial activity.23 As a result, Action Five of the BEPS Project
requires “substantial activity” by a multinational company in order for the
multinational to benefit from the patent box’s lower rate on intellectual prop-
erty income.24 It uses research and development (R&D) expenditures as a
proxy for substantial activity.25 Thus, there must be a link or appropriate
nexus between a multinational company’s R&D expenditures and intellectual
property income receiving the low rate.26 In effect, if a multinational incurred
100% of the costs to develop an intellectual property asset in a country with a
patent box regime, then 100% of the overall income from the intellectual
property asset would be eligible for the regime’s preferential rate.27 But, if
the multinational outsourced all R&D to related parties, then none of the
income from the intellectual property asset would receive tax benefits.28
II. BENEFITS OF THE GLOBAL TRADE
AND TAX AGREEMENTS
The TPP was an agreement of twelve countries that make up forty per-
cent of world trade.29 The OECD’s BEPS Project, however, represents the
consensus view of a much larger group of countries—forty-four countries
that make up roughly ninety percent of the global economy (although over
21. Id. at 30.
22. European countries in particular have been implementing patent boxes. See
OECD, MEASURING AND MONITORING BEPS, supra note 6, at 152. China is the
only non-European country to adopt a patent box regime thus far. See id.
23. OECD, COUNTERING HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES MORE EFFECTIVELY, TAKING
INTO ACCOUNT TRANSPARENCY AND SUBSTANCE: ACTION 5—2014 DELIVERA-
BLE 13 (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264218970-en.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 29.
26. See id.
27. Id. at 31.
28. See id. at 32–33.
29. Kevin Granville, What Is TPP? Behind the Trade Deal That Died, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/business/tpp-ex-
plained-what-is-trans-pacific-partnership.html?_r=0.
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sixty countries were involved in some way with the BEPS Project).30 As a
result, if the BEPS Actions are adopted into domestic law and tax treaties,
they “could have a significant impact on cross border trade and investment
around the world.”31
Multinational trade agreements (like the TPP) and BEPS reflect a coor-
dinated approach to global concerns and a move toward global agreements
among nations. Nations differ in their approaches to workers’ rights, tariffs,
and intellectual property protections, which can negatively impact global
trade. Likewise, nations differ greatly in their income tax policies, which can
incentivize the shifting of intellectual property and related income from high-
tax countries to low-tax jurisdictions.32 Inconsistent tax rules among coun-
tries can also impair export opportunities and economic growth.33 Both
global trade agreements and the BEPS Project reflect a unified approach—
they set common legal rules among countries to boost global trade and
achieve a fairer international tax system.34
There are many benefits to trade agreements that seek to address incon-
sistent rules and open up markets. There are also significant advantages to a
multilateral approach to international tax reform. For example, a multilateral
instrument “would have the same effect as a simultaneous renegotiation of
thousands of bilateral tax treaties,” and would allow “for highly targeted
changes to the treaty network to be adapted in a synchronized manner with-
out creating the potential for violation of existing treaties that may result
from unilateral actions by countries.”35
Of course, with global agreements there will be winners and losers
among nations. Under multinational trade agreements, countries invariably
rearrange labor forces and rearrange product flows, which may result in cer-
tain jobs moving overseas.36 Likewise, the BEPS Project will require coun-
tries to rearrange intellectual property profit flows. As a result, we may see
30. See Amanda Heale & Patrick Marley, BEPS Recommendations Could Signifi-




32. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 121ST CONG., BACKGROUND,
SUMMARY, AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT
SHIFTING PROJECT, at 12, 41 (2015), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?
func=fileinfo&id=4853.
33. See id. at 6.
34. See id. at 9.
35. See id. at 32.
36. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, What’s Wrong with the TPP? This Deal Will Lead to
More Job Loss and Downward Pressures on the Wages of Most Working Amer-
icans, ECON. POLICY INST. (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.epi.org/blog/whats-
wrong-with-the-tpp-this-deal-will-lead-to-more-job-loss-and-downward-pres-
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more robust taxation in countries (like the United States), and less taxation in
popular tax haven jurisdictions (like Ireland) where intellectual property is
often parked.37 Of course, if a country (like the United States) loses jobs as a
result of trade agreements, it is essential that it gets additional tax revenues
from those multinationals that realize additional profits from labor cost sav-
ings. Otherwise, implementation of trade agreements without the BEPS Pro-
ject effect could have double negative consequences—a lose-lose
proposition.
Some multinational companies may find that they will benefit from
trade agreements, but pay more taxes under BEPS. For example, some ar-
gued that the TPP agreement regarding patents would have made drugs more
expensive and would have profited pharmaceutical companies (i.e., the TPP
would have extended monopolies that large pharmaceutical companies have
on prescription drugs, which would have expanded their profits).38 Although
the TPP might arguably have resulted in more profits for these pharmaceuti-
cal companies, the BEPS Project, if implemented, would ensure that those
profits get appropriately taxed. BEPS actions most likely will increase tax
compliance costs for multinational companies, especially with respect to in-
creased information sharing.39 In addition, BEPS will diminish the rights of
multinationals to locate their intellectual property in physical locations they
choose.40
It is possible that multinational trade agreements like the TPP and BEPS
can produce a win-win for some multinational companies. It was suggested,
for instance, that both the “TPP and BEPS [would] be of greatest benefit to
those companies [that] are seeking to expand and invest across borders from
a zero or small base—it is these companies that will be the engine of global
growth.”41
sures-on-the-wages-of-most-working-americans/ (arguing that the TPP would
result in more jobs moving from America to Vietnam).
37. See ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS
2015–2019, supra note 4.
38. See Jaclyn Schiff, Patently Perturbed: Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Deal
Raises Fears About Drug Patent Periods, Higher Costs, MODERN HEALTHCARE
(June 4, 2016), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160604/MAGA
ZINE/306049978.
39. See Jason J. Fichtner & Adam N. Michel, The OECD’s Conquest of the United
States: Understanding the Costs and Consequences of the BEPS Project and
Tax Harmonization, MERCATUS CTR. 30–31 (2016), https://www.mercatus.org/
system/files/Fichtner-BEPS-Initiative-v1.pdf.
40. See id. at 3–4.
41. A Good Day for International Expansion: Global Agreements on Trade and
Transfer Pricing Are Good News for Growing Businesses, GRANT THORNTON
(Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.grantthornton.global/en/insights/articles/trade-agree
ments/.
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Both global trade agreements (like the TPP) and the BEPS can produce
a win-win for countries as well. New Zealand, for example, hailed both the
TPP deal and the BEPS Project. Once fully phased in, the TPP would have
eliminated ninety-three percent of New Zealand’s tariffs on trade with the
other member nations.42 New Zealand would also gain to benefit from BEPS.
According to its Finance Minister: “It matters because New Zealand is be-
coming more and more attractive as a place to do business and invest in, so
it’s critical that we continue to strengthen our tax rules to ensure overseas
companies pay their fair share.”43
III. THE ISSUE OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY
Global agreements can raise questions about national sovereignty. To-
day, nations compete with one another to attract and retain jobs and valuable
activities within their borders through various means, including tax incen-
tives. Some have questioned whether the multinational trade agreements (like
the TPP) trample on democracy and national sovereignty.44 Likewise, some
have argued that the BEPS Project, designed to harmonize international tax
rules, will harm tax competition by protecting high-tax countries at the ex-
pense of low-tax countries. Some fear that there is a movement toward a
unified international tax system in which tax competition is eliminated com-
pletely.45 This raises interesting questions about a country’s sovereignty in
terms of tax policy. Specifically, do multilateral efforts among nations to
42. Mary Swire, New Zealand Hails TPP Deal, BEPS Project Conclusion, GLOB.
TAX NEWS (Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.tax-news.com/news/New_Zealand_Hails
_TPP_Deal_BEPS_Project_Conclusion____69344.html (quoting Trade Minis-
ter Tim Groser: “Overall, TPP is a very positive agreement for New Zealand,
further improving access to international markets, which supports our exporters
to grow and create new jobs”).
43. Id. (quoting Finance Minister Bill English).
44. Corporations, for example, will have the right to challenge U.S. laws before
international tribunals.
45. The Mercatus Research Center has criticized BEPS’ solution to income shifting
as attempting “to consolidate rather than coordinate diverse systems.” See
Fichtner & Michel, supra note 39, at 3, 22 (exploring “the unintended and
unseen consequences of consolidating international tax rules using the BEPS
Project as an example of how such centralization is costly and ultimately inef-
fective,” and also arguing that the OECD’s mission has “evolved from issues of
double taxation to advocation for a unified international tax system”). The Coa-
lition for Tax Competition has asked Congress to stop subsidizing the OECD
because the BEPS Project is undermining American interests by targeting U.S.
companies. According to the group, “[r]educing tax competition results in an
overall higher tax environment and a weaker global economy.” Letter from
Coalition for Tax Competition to Senators and Representatives (May 12, 2016),
http://www.freedomandprosperity.org/files/OECD/ctc-OECDFundingBEPS-
2016-05-12.pdf.
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unify domestic tax policies to combat base erosion and achieve more effec-
tive market competition somehow weaken each country’s sovereignty in
terms of tax policy?
The BEPS Project has potentially greater implications for the giving up
of national autonomy than the TPP would have had. The OECD, however,
has suggested that “acting together will reinforce rather than weaken each
country’s sovereign tax policies,” as countries “have long accepted that they
should set limits and that they should not engage in harmful tax practices.”46
The OECD’s BEPS Project is essentially a step to get countries to practice
what they have long accepted.
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE BEPS PROJECT
It will be interesting to see how nations respond to the OECD’s BEPS
recommendations. Just as there was resistance to the TPP, there has been
some resistance to BEPS from some U.S. policymakers. Although OECD
countries cooperated in developing the BEPS action plans, it is doubtful all
will follow through and adopt BEPS compliance measures back home. The
United States, in particular, has a long history of “tax exceptionalism” and
does not feel bound to any international norms. Although the United States
was at the table in developing the BEPS actions, some members of Congress
have already expressed reluctance to adopt all of BEPS’s sweeping propos-
als. Senator Orrin Hatch stated that the recommendations contained in BEPS
raise a number of serious concerns.47 House Speaker Paul Ryan also re-
marked: “[Regardless of BEPS] Congress will craft the tax rules that it be-
lieves work best.”48 It will be interesting to see whether countries, like the
United States, will ultimately opt to relinquish some of their jurisdictional
autonomy.49
46. Remarks of Secretary-General of the OECD Angel Guria, OECD (Feb. 11,
2014), http://www.oecd.org/tax/taxation-and-competition-policy.htm (discuss-
ing taxation and competition policy).
47. Press Release, Sen. Hatch to Hold Finance Hearing on OECD BEPS Reports,
Sen. Fin. Comm. (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.finance.senate.gov/chairmans-
news/hatch-to-hold-finance-hearing-on-oecd-beps-reports.
48. Letter from Sen. Orrin Hatch & Rep. Paul Ryan to Jacob Lew, Sec’y of the
Treasury (June 9, 2015), https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Hatch
,%20Ryan%20Call%20on%20Treasury%20to%20Engage%20Congress%20on
%20OECD%20International%20Tax%20Project.pdf.
49. ROSANNE ALTSHULER ET AL., LESSONS THE UNITED STATES CAN LEARN FROM
OTHER COUNTRIES’ TERRITORIAL SYSTEMS FOR TAXING INCOME OF MULTINA-
TIONAL COMPANIES 38 (2015), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/
files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/2000077-lessons-the-us-can-learn-from-other-
countries.pdf (“As the economic differences between the United States and
other countries narrow, however, and the U.S. share of world output declines,
the ability of the United States to sustain U.S. tax exceptionalism will also
decline.”).
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Although the United States has killed the TPP, one thing is for certain
with respect to international tax reform: doing nothing is not an option for
both low-tax countries that are under scrutiny for their harmful tax practices
and high-tax countries that are looking for ways to increase tax revenue.
Most likely, countries will attempt to pass laws that are BEPS compliant.
Despite initial reservations expressed by members of the U.S. Congress,
there were some signs that the United States, at least under the Obama Ad-
ministration, intended to meet the multilateral commitment it made in the
OECD’s BEPS Project. Under President Obama, for example, the Treasury
and the IRS released final regulations that require country-by-country report-
ing as recommended in BEPS Action Plan Thirteen.50
But, several challenges lie ahead. For starters, it is likely we will see
incomplete and uneven adoption by OECD member countries.51 The BEPS
Project recommendations (totaling nearly 2,000 pages) could be subject to
differing interpretations, which could lead to inconsistent laws.52 In addition,
countries have different goals and face different constraints, which could re-
sult in different types and levels of taxation.53 To the extent countries adopt
inconsistent or incoherent rules, more disputes are likely to arise.54
50. 26 C.F.R. § 1.6038-4 (2016) (requiring country-by-country reports from U.S.
parent companies with $850 million or more in annual revenue). In contrast, it
does not appear yet that the Trump Administration is interested in pursuing
many of the cooperative solutions in the BEPS project. Indeed, recent tax law
changes in the United States (e.g., reduction in corporate income tax rate and
enactment of several anti-base erosion measures) may signal continued anti-
globalization (nationalism), which makes BEPS project success more elusive.
51. Clausing, The Effect of Profit Shifting, supra note 5, at 22.
52. David Rosenbloom has predicted: “Coordination of the BEPS actions seems
unlikely. . . . The more foreseeable result is a cacophony of new rules, predi-
cated on BEPS and tempered only by the views of individual countries regard-
ing adverse impacts on the inflow of capital.” Rosenbloom & Brothers, supra
note 13, at 759, 764.
53. See OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Initiative: Summary Re-
sults of Second Annual Multinational Survey, DELOITTE (May 2015), https://
www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-beps-
short-summary-survey-resullts-may-2015.pdf (finding seventy-five percent of
multinationals surveyed expect some form of double taxation as nations re-
spond to the OECD’s recommendations).
54. Action 14 makes dispute solution mechanisms more effective. OECD/G20
BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, MAKING DISPUTE RESOLUTION
MECHANISMS MORE EFFECTIVE, ACTION 14 – 2015 FINAL REPORT 11, OECD
(2015), http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/taxation/
making-dispute-resolution-mechanisms-more-effective-action-14-2015-final-
report_9789264241633-en#.WNG3PBiZNTY. This is important because many
BEPS disputes are likely forthcoming.
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A major challenge with BEPS will be determining a multinational com-
pany’s source of income. Substantively, BEPS adheres to separate entity re-
porting and maintains reliance on transfer pricing and the arm’s length
principle to limit income shifting.55 While adhering to the arm’s length prin-
ciple, BEPS provides steps to ensure that transfer pricing outcomes better
align with value creation. In essence, BEPS is a move towards more robust
source taxation. Aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value creation, or
identifying a locatable source of income, however, is easier said than done,
because it is always debatable where value is created.56 Consider a multina-
tional company that conducts research in the United States, has goods based
on that research manufactured in China, and then sells those manufactured
goods to customers in Europe. Where is the value created? The United States
would argue that much of the value lies in the intellectual property that goes
into the goods. China, in turn, would argue that much of the value of the
firm’s products lies in their physical production.57 And European nations
would insist that the value lies in marketing and product sales to customers in
Europe. The problem is magnified even further when we consider that glob-
ally integrated multinational companies typically earn more profits than their
component parts would have earned alone.58
55. Indeed, the relevance of arm’s length pricing is a key component of the BEPS
Project; it forms the basis of several actions plans as noted above. See JOY
HAIL, BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING (BEPS): ARE YOU READY? 57
(2015).
56. Michael J. Graetz & Rachael Doud, Technological Innovation, International
Competition, and the Challenges of International Income Taxation, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 347, 416 (2013) (noting that achieving multilateral consensus
on where intellectual property income should be sourced—e.g., where R&D is
conducted, where intellectual property is legally protected, where intellectual
property is exploited, and where products created with intellectual property are
consumed—will be controversial); Clausing, The Effect of Profit Shifting,
supra note 5, at 22 (“An essential difficulty lies in the problem of establishing
the source of income for firms that are truly globally integrated.”).
57. Keith Bradsher, China to Crack Down on Tax Collection from Multinational
Companies, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/05/
business/international/china-to-enforce-tax-collection-from-multinational-com-
panies.html (“Officials in China, the world’s largest manufacturer, have long
contended that much of the value of a good lies in its physical production, and
not in the intellectual property that went into the item, which is often created
elsewhere.”).
58. Clausing, The Effect of Profit Shifting, supra note 5, at 23 (“[T]he global inte-
gration of businesses generates profits above and beyond what would be gener-
ated if domestic businesses merely interacted at arm’s-length. Since
multinational firms earn more than their component parts would have earned
alone, it is an arbitrary exercise to figure out where the additional profit should
reside.”).
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Identifying source of income is also difficult as value creation activities
(whether we define those as actual R&D, the manufacturing of products, or
the sale of products) change often in our rapidly changing global economy.
Consider, for example the relationship between Apple, Inc. and China. China
has historically manufactured a lot of Apple, Inc.’s products. But over time,
China has also represented an increasingly greater percentage of Apple’s net
sales (twenty-five percent in 2015). Moreover, in late 2016, it was reported
that Apple was opening its first research and development center in China “to
extend its reach in a vital market”59 (investing $45 million in a facility that
will have 500 employees, and combine Apple’s “engineering and operations
teams in China”).60 Shortly thereafter Apple announced that it was opening
another R&D center in China.61 As Apple’s and China’s economic relation-
ship evolves, so too does their tax relationship.
Some have questioned whether international income has a locatable
source62—a reason the second-best option, formulary apportionment, might
make sense. Indeed some commentators have suggested that the BEPS Pro-
ject will encourage countries to move away from separate entity accounting
and adopt formulary apportionment to expand their tax base.63 Formulary
apportionment would allocate a multinational company’s income based on
some combination of factors. To illustrate, assume that the United States has
a three-factor formula—sales, payroll, and physical assets—and gives equal
weight to each factor. Now assume that a multinational company earned $1
billion worldwide. Thirty percent of the multinational’s payroll and assets are
59. Samantha Masunaga, Apple Reportedly Is Opening a Research and Develop-
ment Center in China, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/
business/la-fi-tn-apple-china-20160930-snap-story.html.
60. Jethro Mullen, Apple Ups China Bet with First Research and Development
Center, CNN MONEY (Aug. 17, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/08/17/tech-
nology/apple-china-investment-research-center/.
61. Apple to Open Second Research Centre in China, MSN MONEY (Oct. 12,
2016), https://www.msn.com/en-sg/money/technology/apple-to-open-second-
research-centre-in-china/ar-AAiRGlB.
62. “[Income] is not susceptible to characterization as to source at all. Income . . .
attaches to someone or something that consumes and that owns assets. Income
does not come from some place, even though we may construct accounts to
approximate it by keeping track of payments that have identifiable and perhaps
locatable sources and destinations.” Graetz & Doud, supra note 56, at 416
(quoting Hugh J. Ault & David F. Bradford, Taxing International Income: An
Analysis of the U.S. System and Its Economic Premises, in TAXATION IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 11, 31 (Assaf Razin & Joel Slemrod eds., 1990), http://
www.nber.org/chapters/c7203.pdf).
63. See Fichtner & Michel, supra note 39, at 31 (“The availability of country-by-
country reporting tax information may pressure some countries to use a formu-
lary apportionment standard as a mechanism to artificially expand their tax
base”).
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in the United States, but sixty percent of the multinational’s sales are in the
United States. Under these facts, the United State’s share of that worldwide
profit would be $400 million.
With formulary apportionment, profit allocation would be based on fac-
tors that reflect real economic activity. Profit allocation would not be sensi-
tive to countries’ varying tax policies regarding tax rates, standards for
determining corporate residency, and approaches to transfer pricing enforce-
ment. And it would not be determined by arbitrary behavior of multinational
companies, such as the number and residency of foreign subsidiaries, or
which transfer pricing methods they use.
Commentators, however, have pointed out conceptual and practical dif-
ficulties with applying formulary apportionment in the global context.64 It
may prove difficult for countries to agree on the formula factors.65 Countries
with large markets would likely want to place greater weight on the “sales”
factor over employees or capital; countries with small markets would likely
64. See Rosanne Altshuler & Harry Grubert, Formula Apportionment: Is It Better
than the Current System and Are There Better Alternatives?, 63 NAT’L TAX J.
1145 (2010); James R. Hines, Jr., Income Misattribution Under Formula Ap-
portionment, 54 EUR. ECON. REV. 108 (2010); Susan C. Morse, Revisiting
Global Formulary Apportionment, 29 VA. TAX REV. 593, 597–99 (2010); Julie
Roin, Can the Income Tax Be Saved? The Promise and Pitfalls of Adopting
Worldwide Formulary Apportionment, 61 TAX LAW REV. 169 (2008) (noting
political realities); Jane Gravelle, Policy Options to Address Corporate Profit
Shifting: Carrots or Sticks?, N.Y.U. COLLOQUIUM ON TAX POL’Y & PUB. FIN.
31–33 (Apr. 26, 2016), http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_docu
ments/Jane%20Gravelle.pdf (summarizing barriers to formulary apportion-
ment). See also Walter Hellerstein, Designing the Limits of Formulary Income
Attribution Regimes, 72 ST. TAX NOTES 45 (2014).
65. Advocates of formulary apportionment typically leave intangibles out of the
formula because if they were included, “the same problems of attributing in-
come to a location under transfer pricing would arise.” Fichtner & Michel,
supra note 39, at 29 (citing Charles E. McLure, U.S. Federal Use of Formula
Apportionment to Tax Income from Intangibles, TAX NOTES TODAY (Mar. 11,
1997)). See also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Between Formulary Apportionment
and the OECD Guidelines: A Proposal for Reconciliation, 2 WORLD TAX J. 3,
17 (2010) (“Intangibles are excluded, but in my opinion that is appropriate
because (a) their value results from physical and human capital and from the
market and those elements are included [in the traditional three factor formula
of payroll, sales, and tangible assets], and (b) you cannot allocate their value
and trying to include them invites manipulation.”).
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resist.66 Even if countries could agree on the formula factors, formulary ap-
portionment might encourage multinationals to move the formula factors,
such as jobs and factories, to low-tax jurisdictions in order to reduce their tax
burden.67 This illustrates the significant impact one global agreement (like
the TPP) could have on another global agreement (BEPS). To the extent the
TPP would have encouraged jobs (one of the formula factors) to move off-
shore from the United States to Vietnam, for example, Vietnam would have
seen an increase in corporate income taxation.
V. FINAL THOUGHTS
The BEPS Project, the OECD’s crackdown on multinationals’ shifting
of profits to low-tax jurisdictions, is potentially a bigger deal than multina-
tional trade agreements, such as the TPP. While countries now struggle to
figure out what to do considering the death of the TPP, the BEPS Project
serves the useful purpose of showing the complex tax practices of multina-
tional companies.68
Developing countries should pay close attention to BEPS implementa-
tion and its focus on source-based taxation.69 They should also be aware of
alternatives to BEPS-like, source-based taxation—such as formulary appor-
tionment—that are being discussed as global tax reform alternatives. Viet-
nam and many other developing countries are aware of the role taxation
plays in their economic growth strategies. Vietnam itself has an attractive
corporate income tax rate of twenty percent as of January 1, 2016 (decreased
from twenty-five percent to twenty-two percent to twenty percent in recent
66. See Mitchel Udell & Aditi Vashist, Sales-Factor Apportionment of Profits to
Broaden the Tax Base, TAX NOTES TODAY (June 17, 2014). China may benefit
from formulary apportionment because of its large employment footprint.
Fichtner & Michel, supra note 39, at 31. Tax haven countries typically employ
relatively few employees of multinationals.
67. Fichtner & Michel, supra note 39, at 21 (arguing that with formulary appor-
tionment real profit shifting will replace artificial profit shifting) (citing David
Ernick et al., You Look Familiar: The OECD Looks to U.S. State Tax Policy for
BEPS Solutions, in U.S. STATE TAX CONSIDERATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL
TAX REFORM 111, 116 (Tax Analysts 2014)). Currently, the top employment
countries for the foreign affiliates of U.S. multinational companies are large
economies with large markets (China, United Kingdom, Canada, Mexico, In-
dia, Germany, Brazil, France, Japan, and Australia). Clausing, The Effect of
Profit Shifting, supra note 5, at 8, 32.
68. Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Four Questions to Ask About OECD’s BEPS Project,
PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (June 9, 2015), https://piie.com/blogs/real-
time-economic-issues-watch/four-questions-ask-about-oecds-beps-project.
69. See, e.g., Yariv Brauner, What the BEPS?, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 55, 74–75 (2014)
(describing source rules as a main source of “controversy between developing
countries and the OECD”).
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years).70 And it offers preferential tax treatments to encouraged sectors, such
as high-technology, scientific research, and computer software manufactur-
ing. As its economy changes because of TPP-like trade agreements, so too
will its share of total global tax revenues of multinational companies.
In sum, future TPP-like multinational trade agreements and the OECD’s
BEPS recommendations are rare moments of international collaboration.
Their intersection cannot be ignored.
70. For summaries, see INTERNATIONAL TAX: VIETNAM HIGHLIGHTS 2017,
DELOITTE (2017), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Doc-
uments/Tax/dttl-tax-vietnamhighlights-2017.pdf.; VIETNAM TAX PROFILE,
KPMG (June 2015), https://home.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2015/11/
vietnam-asean-tax-2015.pdf.
